Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick for $3+ Billion was a homecoming of sorts.

DoubleClick was the original ad network. During the dot com boom, they were the pride of silicon alley and king of web advertising (outside of Yahoo! which was captive at the time).

Yet something happened between 2001-2005 . . . . DoubleClick lost it mojo. . . and its marketcap went from $15 BILLION to around $500M. And finally went private for around $1B in 2005.

Yes, $3B is an ungodly sum, but DoubleClick could have been Google; or atleast Google Adsense. But it didnt, so what happened?

Adsense kicked its ass . . . thats what. . .

DoubleClick was way too close to Madison avenue (physically and figuratively). It looked at the online advertising market with the same mindset as offline (TV, Print) advertising.

- It relied way too much on the sales force, deciding against investing in a self serve model which prevented it from scaling. Even more importantly, while the model worked in 1999 when traffic was centered around major portals and destination, as the web “long tail” proliferated, doubleclick lost a huge portion of its traffic monopoly as they were not able to serve that segment through its sales force.

-Just as important. DoubleClick looked at web targeting on purely offline terms. HH income, age, ethnicity, etc. Google, on the other hand, looked at it from an algorithmic angle and figured out that RELEVANCY was the variable which loaded the highest for click through rather than all the traditional targeting attribute. And ofcourse, relevancy and content are intricably linked. (and thus text).

MOST IMPORTANTLY. DoubleClick made a huge strategic blunder. They saw their adserving technology as something to be sold modularly rather than bundled with their ad network. They became a provider of commoditized technology and lost its ability to insert itself between the buyer and seller of advertising. It no longer controlled pricing and placement of ads. It quickly failed to become a NETWORK (with network effects) but became an ASP. There was no network based relationship . . . simply a licensing contract.

Adsense was/is brilliant in this regard. Its a black box; buyers really has very little say (until recently when Adsense has scaled significantly already) on where to place their advertising. Publishers on the other hand, has very little say in their rate card . . . EVEN MORE SO . . . both sides simply allowed Google to determine Adsense’s cut as it wishes. So long as both sides get what they want (clicks & $), the network effects kept both party from dis-intermediating Adsense AND switching to a different provider. People complain about the black box nature of the Adsense system and as a result, startups try to bring transparency to the ad network game. What they fail to realize is that the black box is the secret sauce; it gives Google the ability to increase optimization, monetization, and placement at its whim (usually for the better). The black box might seem draconian at first. . . but ultimately benefits both sides if all they care about is the all mighty dollar.

It looks like the secret sauce is going to get applied to DoubleClick soon . . .

It is well known that the advertising industry has a high Beta compared to the general economy. In short, the industry does very well during good times and very bad during bad times. There are several reasons to this, when the economy does well 1) companies forgo ROI for marketshare 2) companies believes advertising is a capital expenditure to build brand equity 3) keeping up with the jones, as advertising effectiveness is extremely sensitive to competitive spend. It is not to say these reasons are not rational, they are somewhat. But that the industry tends to go in boom and bust cycles because of them.

Google’s is in this very cyclical industry . . . so much so that the offline equivalent of ad brokers (agencies) are mostly private shops or loose but public cooperatives/roll ups to even out the cyclicality. Furthermore, Google has one large issue. . . that like the Real Estate bubble in Hong Kong in the mid 90’s, much of the spending on Adwords has been done by speculators trying to arbitrage traffic/eyeballs rather than companies productively selling a service or product.

For the past months, I’ve been tracking (unscientifically) the percent of adword advertisers with the main business model of advertising. In short, instead of selling shoes or providing a service (like translation or loan brokerage), these sites are simply trying to pay for eyeball on Google and hoping to make more than they spend on getting that visit (or visitor if the site is sticky enough). Even worse, some of these companies are venture funded so they are simply looking at whether the cost of that visit will get them an equivalent increase in VALUATION. They dont mind losing money, as long as they can flip the company to someone else in the short term.

In decemenber I tracked about 200 queries and found that about 20% of adword advertisers are arbitragers. Early this week, that # has gone up to about 35%. Again this is about unscientific as it gets and I hope some research analyst will start tracking this metric sytematically.

But I think the point is made that increasingly the revenue growth google is able to capture are significantly more risky than before. Google’s revenue beta is becoming higher and Wall Street has yet to take that into consideration. Remember back in the dot com days, all the venture money raised was poured into buying Sun hardware. when the bubble collapsed, so did Sun. Today, because the lower cost of infrastructure, this money has been poured into advertising and marketing instead (specifically into Google with a disproportionate share). If (when?) the battle for traffic is over and the casualties emerge, a significant portion of Google’s advertiers (and corresponding revenue) will also go the way of a server spending on Solaris machines . . .

But like a game of chicken, advertising spend usually drop off the cliff rather than decelerate, so there will be little to no warning when it does happen.

Online forums around brands (aka fan sites) - everything from Tyra Banks to Bratz are big business. Anyone that has searched for information on google or yahoo will realize that forums represents a disproportionate portion of the search results due to the large amount of dynamic & fresh content generated. All if not most are moneitzed through YPN or Adsense - Google ’s Adsense is generating around $4B a year for Google and probably $8-$12B in total for millions of webmasters. To realize how big this “digital underground” is all we need to do is to take a stroll on sitepoint or webmasterworld. (Monetizing the longtail of websites if you well!)

Foremanski has some good comments from the business perspective.

There is, however, something more going on here from search marketing perspective. . .

1. Yahoo can give preferential treatment to these sites over independent fan sites and forums. Try a Maria Carey search on Yahoo and you will notice the Yahoo Artist page as the top result. This will happen to a lot of top search terms going forward.

2. Even Google will give these sites higher rank compared to independent sites because they are hosted on a yahoo domain which has high PageRank (wii.yahoo.com for example)

3. Having the search term in the subdomain (wii.yahoo.com) could potentially increase search ranking as well (somewhat debatable)

4. Conversely, this could be considered a form of cyber squatting (a subset of the copyright issue widely mentioned) given the brand name in the subdomain

5. Yahoo will for sure expand this down its list of search terms and eventually extract more and more value and advertising dollars from webmasters who runs these fan sites and forums.

Time will tell but this could be a turning point for the large community of niche sites having their way until recently on drawing internet traffic away from larger commercial website. . . Yahoo is fighting back and so are other media companies (note the recent spat of “social networking” initiatives from media companies)

ReveNews speculates that ValueClick is planning to sell CJ and focus on its behavioral targeting business and perhaps build out an agency.

Who Might Buy CJ
Advertising.com, aquired by AOL in 2004, has been attempting to set up an affiliate network for years and has never managed to get traction for various reasons. If it buys CJ, then this gives them a huge footprint in the affiliate marketing space. Also, the CJ network should fit in nicely in properties that form Ad.com.

As for my other thought, first let me emphasis, this is all speculation and I have no inside information from anyone, so what I’m about to say is just some thinking aloud. Experian Interactive is building an online lead gen powerhouse, and CJ, with it’s strong anchor in lead gen, fits nicely in its portfolio of companies. And they get affiliate marketing, after all, LowerMyBills.com and ClassesUSA are just affiliates that set up a sale side and then grew into giants.

And I’m sure their would be many other suiters that would buy CJ too. It seems to me, ValueClick is at a crossroads when it comes to CJ; this will be interesting to watch.

If I was eBay, I would be looking at this very very carefully. I would use leaving CJ as a leveragee to give it negotiating power so it can acquire it cheaper than anyone else. Once eBay buys it, it no longer has to invest in its own affiliate technology to increase margins. Plus, if I was ebay, I’ll combine it with the contexual program its testing and take on adsense (starting with its huge base of affiliate marketers who 100% also uses adsense). Futhermore, it can turn its world class internet marketing team/technology into a profit center rather than a cost center . . . this is a bet that eBay NEEDS to make. and sounds like the ante is not that high either . . .

Core Marketplace + Express + Pay Per Call + Pay Per Acquisition + “Future Initiatives” are all viable bets around the advertising/marketing (or simply customer acquisition) industry . . . where Google hasnt gotten a strong head start.

(Guest Column: Peter Daley, Digital Media Analyst, Rutberg & Co)

During the one month period from July 1 through July 31, 34 private digital media companies announced $403.1 million in venture capital financings. Investments were primarily in the Advertising Infrastructure, Applications, and Content Publishers sectors. There were also 24 M&A transactions announced during the period, including Motorola’s acquisition of Broadbus, AMD’s acquisition of ATI, and Planar System’s acquisition of Clarity Visual Systems.

In this newsletter, rather than our traditional review of the previous month’s news items, we discuss the venture capital, M&A, and IPO activity in digital media over the past two quarters and compare these findings to the activity of 2005.

Venture capital activity in digital media is, by all accounts, robust. During the first six months of 2006, private digital media companies raised $2.4 billion of venture capital through 278 financings. This activity nearly matches that of the full year 2005, in which $2.6 billion was raised through 313 financings. Notably, 245 venture capital firms announced two or more digital media investments during the eighteen month period between January, 2005, and June, 2006.

The robust activity indicated by the financing totals is consistent with our conversations with entrepreneurs and investors. On an anecdotal basis, for example, we note the formation by numerous venture firms of digital media-specific strategies, practices, and portfolios over the past two years. Although raising capital is never “easy,” we believe the current environment is healthy for private digital media companies.

The M&A market remained steady in 1H06 with 181 transactions announced during the period, as compared to 183 and 185 in 1H05 and 2H05, respectively. Further, the IPO market for digital media companies remains muted. During the first half of 2006, only 6 IPOs were filed and 6 were priced in the industry, as compared to 5 filed and 19 priced in 2005. We do not find visibility toward a substantial change in the dynamics of the IPO market in the near-term. As such, we believe M&A remains the far more likely exit scenario for private equity investors.

Overall, we note that venture capital activity has increased substantially over the previous 18 months, while M&A activity has remained steady over this same period. Several venture investors in our conversations have referred to this situation as a “bubble without an exit,” indicating a concern and frustration over the high investment levels but low exit numbers. As we discuss below, we believe that this situation may be, at least partly, due to the early stage of digital media as an industry, and that there are underlying, positive indicators for future M&A activity in the industry.

Venture capital activity in digital media is, by all accounts, robust. During the first six months of 2006, private digital media companies raised $2.4 billion of venture capital through 278 financings. This activity nearly matches that of the full year 2005, in which $2.6 billion was raised through 313 financings.

On a quarterly basis, total venture capital raised during 2Q06 was $1.3 billion, representing 127% growth from the total during 2Q05.

Heading into 3Q06, venture investors appear poised to continue their strong pace. The $403 million of venture capital raised in July 2006 is on par with the $398 million monthly average over the previous six months.

The robust activity indicated by the financing totals is consistent with our conversations with entrepreneurs and investors. On an anecdotal basis, for example, we note the formation by numerous venture firms of digital media-specific strategies, practices, and portfolios over the past two years. Additionally, we hear comments from several entrepreneurs on strong interest by venture firms and on relatively attractive transaction valuations. Although raising capital is never “easy,” we believe the current environment is healthy for private digital media companies.

Size of Financings

In terms of financing size, the average size of digital media venture transactions has remained stable since 2005. During 1H06, the average financing size was $10.6 million, as compared to $9.1 million and $11.5 million during 1H05 and 2H05, respectively.

Interestingly, over this period, transactions have trended toward smaller (less than $5MM) and larger (greater than $20MM) financings. The percentage of mid-sized (between $5MM and $20MM) financings has commensurately decreased. We believe this change in distribution is driven by two factors: 1) increased venture capital for private companies in the Applications sector, which is at an early stage of development and which typically requires less total capital commitments per company than the broader digital media industry; and 2) the emergence of private companies with late stage revenue levels in several digital media sectors, such as Semiconductors, Content Service Providers & Retailers, and Advertising Infrastructure.

Most Active Sectors

The sectors with the largest total venture capital raised during 1H06 were Semiconductors, Content Service Providers & Retailers, and Advertising Infrastructure. Notable financings during the period were: $150 million by Amp’d Mobile, $49.2 million by Digi TV Plus, $48.5 million by MovieBeam, $48 million by AdKnowledge, and $46.6 million by Sling Media.

By number of financings, the Applications, Advertising Infrastructure, and Provisioning & Delivery Infrastructure sectors were the most active during 1H06. In particular, the Applications sector included 46 financings during 1H06, as compared to just 9 financings during 1H05. The significant rise in venture activity in Applications companies is driven, among other factors, by the investment theses in user-generated content and other personal media.

Overall, as per our comments in recent newsletters, we remain bullish on investment theses related to user-generated content, casual video games, and content delivery networks, among other areas.

Most Active Investors

The investors with the greatest number of digital media investments in 1H06 were Intel Capital, Sequoia Capital, Cisco Systems, and Draper Fisher Jurvetson. Notably, 245 venture capital firms announced two or more digital media investments during the eighteen month period between January, 2005, and June, 2006. In our view, this demonstrates the broad participation and interest in the industry by venture firms.

Number of M&A Transactions

The M&A market remained steady in 1H06 with 181 transactions announced during the period, as compared to 183 and 185 in 1H05 and 2H05, respectively. Notable recent transactions involving venture-funded private companies include Microsoft’s acquisition of Massive, VeriSign’s acquisition of m-Qube, and Viacom/MTV’s acquisition of Atom Entertainment.

The North America region saw the largest number of transactions during 1H06, with 94 M&A announcements. M&A activity in the Asia region, however, increased significantly, representing 19% of transactions in 1H06, as compared to 8% in 2005.

Most Active Sectors

The 1H06 M&A transactions were primarily in the Content Service Providers & Retailers, Advertising Infrastructure, and Content Creators sectors. The Retailing Infrastructure sector experienced the sharpest rise in M&A activity, with 14 transactions announced in 1H06, as compared to 4 in 1H05. Further, the steepest decline in M&A activity occurred in the Content Publishers sector, with 19 transactions announced in 1H06, as compared to 36 in 1H05.

The IPO market for digital media companies remains muted. During the first half of 2006, only 6 IPOs were filed and 6 were priced in the industry, as compared to 5 filed and 19 priced in 2005. In our conversations with private company board members and CEOs, we find several inhibitors for IPO activity, including the generally unreceptive public markets and Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs and risks. We do not find visibility toward a substantial change in the dynamics of the IPO market in the near-term. As such, we believe M&A remains the far more likely exit scenario for private equity investors.

Overall, we note that venture capital activity has increased substantially over the previous 18 months, while M&A activity has remained steady over this same period. Several venture investors in our conversations have referred to this situation as a “bubble without an exit,” indicating a concern and frustration over the high investment levels but low exit numbers. In our view, this situation may be, at least partly, due to the early stage of digital media as an industry. Industry drivers of broadband penetration and alternative media business models are just now emerging as visible, mass market forces, and revenues from the associated services and technologies are only recently beginning to be explored, defined, or built. Further, we find that interest on behalf of potential acquirers exists, even if only on an exploratory basis. Although it is infeasible to predict timing or to provide certainty, we believe the underlying dynamics are positive indicators for future M&A activity in the industry.

Om Malik correctly pointed out that Google Checkout is a loss leader for the CPA Google ad network.

It is a FLANK assault on eBay’s PayPal’s MERCHANT business. . . it is even more of a frontal assault on eBay’s marketplace business. Here is something to noodle over.

eBay + eBay AdContext = Google Sponsor Link Search + Adsense + Google CheckOut - Non Products Searches

OR

eBay + eBay AdContext+ Crawled Product Search (like vast) = Google Search + Adsense + Google Checkout - Non Products Searches

Get it? The point is that eBay IS ALREADY a semi CPA network with the addition of AdContext. The pieces are all there for a major confrontation of Google & eBay. . . ok. . . I’ve screamed and yelled before that CPA is not panacea or a CPC killer. And I know no one is listening especially OM.

BUT if the world is going to wholesales turns to CPA advertising. . . the winner is not Google , its eBay. . . (or more likely, affiliate networks like commission junction/linkshare ) eBay is much closer in achieving the CPA vision than Google. All eBay would need to build is a SYI form that is not just for creating listings but for creating syndicated “ads” (ofcourse not all merchants wants to create ads, in that case AdContext actually works great by automatically generating ads) . [Google is working this, to autogenerate ads for advertisers for an additional fee]

To not only fend off GoogleCheckout, but counter assault, eBay needs to expand beyond products (my guess is 50% Google’s ad revenue) to services (another 35%?) + add a crawler of somesort to aggregate more commerce content not on eBay.

The affiliate networks on the other hand needs to band together, offer a checkout solution, and hire more PHD’s to automate ad placement and relevancy. (or sell themselves to a GYM+E)

Google is not the only game in town. The next 12 months will be very very interesting in the advertising industry.

is Liquidity . . .

Snap has been tauting the value of PPA (Pay per Action ) for a while, and I certainly believes that in many ways its a superior model to PPC as pioneered by Overture/Google. (less spamming, higher monetization, less agency issues. . .etc) (What is eBay BTW then a PPA network?, so I do think the model has significant merits . . . AFTER liquidity has been achieved)

Today, Snap launched a whole bunch of new features hoping to gain the kind of buzz ASK did the last few months. And ofcourse, spent some time tauting PPA again.

Snap Rethinks Search
Snap, a search engine promising pay-per-action
Ads? Content? Snap.com Blurs the Line
Snap Realizes Own Desperation, Uses it as a Marketing Angle

The problem with PPA is liquidity. In the PPC world, agents (aka SEM firms, spammers, arbitragers, speculators, brokers, market makers etc) actually play a very very important role in the Google ad market. (No, they are not just parasites) Just like the stock, bonds, or commodities market, agents brings liquidity in the market which enables

1) efficient pricing
2) enable principals to hedge out and offload risk to third parties
3) enable principles to participate in the market semi-passively/arms length
4) helps the marketplace scale significantly faster

In the PPA world, the arbitragers do not play a role becaues conversion requirements of PPA . . . requiring principals to participate in the purchase of “advertising” directly. As a result, keyword auctions will often not recieve enough participants to be priced correctly especially in early days of ramp up. Furthermore, PPA networks will need to invest in directly acquiring retailers instead of relying on speculators (keyword spammers?) to bridge the gap between the market and retailer - thus increasing marketing cost. Speculators also help a market grow and scale as Google did between 2000-2003 when keyword arbitragers helped Google scale before principal advertisers (retailers in this case) began joining Google enmass as well.

All is not lost of course if spam becomes a bigger issue for GYM . . . for now though, Snap needs to partner more broadly to offset its liquidity issues.

This is from Google’s corporate overview webpage circa June of 2004:

Google does search. Google does not do horoscopes, financial advice or chat.

More of it at web archive

So the question from me is . . . when is Google Horoscopes’s coming? I see that someone in Australia has already taken the www.googlehoroscopes.com URL. I hope he makes a ton of money re-directing traffic to Google.

more here from siliconvalley.com here

The best and most relevant (to me) web dissertation I’ve ever read was Clay Shirky’s Ontology is Overated. I do not hope to come even close to the clarity and relevance of that manifesto, but I hope to add to the discussion with a narrower (commerce) rather than wider (information retrieval) focus of the topic from the perspective of a specific application. Secondly, I want to take a historical & BROADER view of the topic within the context of e-commerce. Lastly, while there is no ultimate winner (game is not over) nor the right way to architect an “e-commerce information retrieval system,” to this date, there has been a winning methodology as proven by revenue, profits, and even marketcap. How the pendulum will swing in the future, I dont know, but recent technology improvements certainly has allowed various architecture to compensate for the short comming of each.

(BTW, I’m using ontology/taxonomy/attributes as a generalization of any structured content, not technically correct but useful in this case)

At the two ends of the spectrum of e-commerce implementation of a product retreival system are

1. Search Engine + Unstructured Content - Product information is created by product owner (seller, dist, manu etc) in an adhoc manner with minimal regards to standardization or formating. A seach engine is used to find relevant product for buyers based on various algorithms (keywords, pageRank etc)

2. Query + Structured Content - Best way to think about this is a attributed query field and a attributed catalog. Essentially a SQL database with a structured query interface.

There are several examples of along the spectrum.

Google - In the purest sense, Google (not Froogle) is the perfect implementation of such a system with completely unstructured data and search engine

eBay - In the SKU-less world of ebay (circa 2000), seller enter product information in a semi-structured manner. Furthermore, there is no effort to consolidate listings with the same SKU into one giant listing. As far as eBay or any machine is concerned each product listed for sale is completely unique. A search engine is implement to search listing titles and sometime descriptions.

Delicious - There is really no “tag” implementation of a e-commerce search so I’m just gonna let delicious be my straw-man. Some might argue that Delicous and eBay should switch, I however would argue that the act of tagging a product with a set of specific tags is more restricting and thus more structured than eBay’s “Listing Title.” Furthermore, as you’ll see later, eBay and Delicious is creating a Recall/Precision tradeoff consistent with the rest of the spectrum. (BTW, eBay does have a categorization scheme but not in the context of its search engine. The scheme essentially offers an alternative method of navigation. But if you want to, you can switch eBay & Delicious on the spectrum because of this issue)

Amazon - Amazon has a catalog that is SKU centric in that product title and description are standardized for each unique product. Sellers of that product has to list his or her product under that SKU.

Chemdex – A long dead but very relevant example. In many ways represent all B2B e-commerce companies back in 2000. Like a lot of B2B implementation of an e-commerce info retrieval system, aka catalog, Chemdex has a very sophistical, highly attributed, highly structured product content. It has the very definition of an Ontology or Taxonomy (depending on your own interpretation of the word).

As we all know, companies that have taken the critical product strategy decision on the LEFT side of the spectrum on unstructured content has become the dominant players in the e-commerce world. For various reasons I will go into, Google and eBay has garnered a disproportionate amount of the e-commerce spend. Especially in the case of eBay vs. Amazon, the power of the unstructured content has won over rigid standards. While many would argue that eBay has much better business model (no inventory) than Amazon and thus is the leading players, I would argue that because Amazon has adopted this virtual model since 2000 and has yet to narrow the gap, it shows that it is actually the superior product architecture that is the driving force of eBay’s growth. Fundamentally, it is also this unstructured product content architecture that has allowed eBay to maximize its virtual model and thus is the true source of its competitive advantage.

There are several key differences in the spectrum:

1. Sophistication/Effort – On one end, the critical product and differentiation factor is better search algorithm, on the other end, the critical factor is content creation. Essentially, player on the left side of the spectrum decided to spend money on “understand the mess” while on the right side on “cleaning up the mess.”

2. SKU – Due precisely to the decision above, adding & creating content for players on the left is so easy, unlimited # of products can be sold and managed leading to breadth. On the right, because the bottleneck of the commerce system is on the creation of the catalog, companies are forced to focus on the product they can sell and drive inventory turnover for those SKUs (ie depth).

3. Investment – Equally important, Google and eBay lives and die by the “power” of its search engine and thus spend significant money on creating the best of breed algorithm or user experience. Chemdex and Amazon, on the other hand must invest in content creation throughput usually in the form of man power. (Chemdex spends disproportionate amount of its money on this task and eventually went out of business because it too so long, the quality was so bad, and so expensive.)

There are also some key trade offs too

1. Speed – Search Engines are by definition faster than Query Engines. Your SQL results on 100X less magnitude of data is still slower than a Google search. This has serious effects on the user experience especially in B2B.
2. Precision – A key search engine concept. Connoting the “relevancy” of the individual returned results. Structured content typically returns more precious results because more attributes and parameters can be specified by the “buyer”
3. Recall - Another key search engine concept. Connoting the “coverage” of the returned results. IE regardless of # of results returned, as long as all relevant results are included, it has good recall. Unstructured content typically has high recall due to the “fuzziness” & flexibility of its algorithm. Structured content, on the other hand, has serious issues as mentioned by Clay Shirky.
4. Flexibility - This is THE key reason that unstructured content won over structured. The flexibility to sell ANYTHING (kidney on eBay!) allowed eBay to evolve without management interference while Amazon required the creation of new content and new categories.
5. Data Mining - On the other hand, the ability to understand data through structured content is the key competitive differentiator that Amazon has over eBay or Google. It can mine data extensively to create sophisticated cross selling, up selling, recommendation, and personalization features that Google will be hard pressed to implement due to the fact that its data is “dumb.” While this had always been Amazon’s strategy is was still not enough to overcome the rigidity of its product catalog architecture.

These differences and trade offs were made by the various players in the industry. To this date, buyers have shown that a good search engine and unstructured product information source is the superior architecture for creating an e-commerce focused information retrieval system. Thus intelligence has won over brute force. Oh ya, I too, think ontology/taxonomy/attributes is over rated not just philosophically but for business.

I believe the past history of e-commerce search will have serious implications for the so called SEMANTIC web but I’ll save that for the next post when I can think more clearly. (Hint, I’m in Clay’s camp)

Just some of the things I read on tagging recently, there is a lot btw so this is not comprehensive:

Unfolding Ontology from Alex
The Yin and Yan of Tagging
More Clay
More Clay on Tim Bray’s Q
A blog on tagging: You’re It
Fred’s Tags